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Abstract. Forward rates of European currencies against the private and official ECU exhibit a  bias 
similar to the one found in other data: the Cumby-Obstfeld-Fama (COP) regression coefficients are 
systematically below unity, and two thirds of  them are negative. We use the discount of  the private ECU 
relative to the official ECU as a measure of "diffidence", a term that may cover both sharply fluctuating 
risk premia as well as Peso risk. Peso risk, in this context, covers not only fears of realignments but 
also the risk of a meltdown of  the private BCU relative to the official one (a notion that receives some 
support from a time-series analysis of these data). Dichotomizing the data on the basis of  the size of  the 
discount in the private ECU), we find that the COF beta strongly depends on the degree of  diffidence and 
that the negative COF coefficients are generated by typically less than 20 percent of the data. If  the 
diffidence factor contains a risk premium, then this risk premium is definitely not the one predicted by 
Bansal (1997). Nor is the diffidence factor proxying for Huisman et  aI. (1997)'s transaction-cost effects. 
Thus, Peso risk remains as a strong candidate explanation for the forward bias in this sample. 
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Evidence from the Private ECU 
One empirical puzzle in International Finance is the size of the bias in the forward premium as a 
predictor of  future exchange rate changes. The Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis (UEH) posits 
that, in the regression of exchange rate changes on beginning-of-period forward premia, the 
slope should equal unity. However, as shown by e.g. Cumby and Obstfeld (1984), Fama (1984), 
and many others after them-see Froot and Thaler (1990)  for a review-the empirical 
coefficients are not only systematically below unity, but even predominantly negative. True, 
mainstream pricing models predict that risk premia could lower the slope, but not that much 
(Hodrick and Srivastava, 1986; Backus, Foresi, and Telmer, 1996; Hollifield and Uppal, 1997; 
see Bansal (1997) for a dissident view). The empirical results are all the more unexpected as, in 
unconditional tests taken over long periods, the cross-section of average interest differentials 
matches the average rates of  appreciation quite well (Backus et ai., 1996). This contrast between 
the results of regression tests and means tests, coupled with the low R2s of these regressions, 
suggests that the negative COF betas may be generated by a relatively small subset of  data points. 
Most of the regression evidence stems from tests of mainstream floating currencies 
against the USD. In this paper, we study rates of individual EMS currencies against the private 
BCU. As a side benefit, this choice of data allows us to externally validate the findings of other 
studies: our Cumby-Obstfeld-Fama (henceforth COF) style regressions on private-BCU data do 
as badly as usual. However, a replication of (by now) standard regressions on new data is not 
our prime motivation for studying rates against the BCU. What is primarily interesting about this 
market is the availability, next to the BCU as actually traded (the private BCU), of  a theoretical 
("official  ") ECU. Even though it was widely perceived that the private BCU would almost surely 
converge to the official one in due time, still the former often traded at a substantial discount 
relative to the official BCU; and this discount varied markedly over time, waxing and waning in 
line with the (mis)fortunes that befell the EMU's exchange rate mechanism and the prospects for 
eventual monetary unification. For this reason, the discount between the private and official ECUs 
provides a candidate proxy for general diffidence in the market, a term that may cover both 
sharply fluctuating risk premia as well as Peso risk. Peso risk, in this context, may cover not 
only fears of realignments but also the risk of a meltdown of the private ECU relative to the 
official one, a risk stemming from the ambiguity and uncertainty about the nature and legal 
status of the private ECU. 
Risk premia and Peso risks are familiar candidate explanations of the COF puzzle. As is 
well known, a time-varying risk premium generates negative betas only if  it exhibits a strong Peso Risk in the ECU  page 2 
positive correlation with the expectation.! This feature is hard to explain theoretically, but the 
existence of models with the required features can of course never be ruled out a priori. What is 
appealing about the Peso-risk interpretation of the discount in the private ECU is that it does not 
require a specific model. Instead, we can rely on an empirical regularity: when bad news hits the 
market (as indicated by a widening spot discount in the private BCU), then forward rates for the 
private BCU typically predict that even worse is to come. If  the bad news is of the Peso type, 
however, the actual outcome is never, or rarely ever, in the direction predicted by the forward rate. 
Thus, if the discount in the private BCU does reflect Peso risk, then in periods of deep discounts 
we should observe a negative relationship between the forward premium and the actual outcome. 
We do find that (i) deeper discounts in the private BCU are associated with more negative COF 
regression coefficients, and (ii) after dummying out less than 20 percent of the deepest-discount 
data, the COF  coefficients become typically positive. All this is consistent with the Peso 
explanation of  the forward puzzle. 
Still, the discount in the private BCU may be due to other factors than Peso risk. We 
therefore add three more tests. In the first check, we consider the possibility that the discount in 
the private BCU is due to a risk-premium. To explain the patterns that we observe in our main 
tests, we need a risk premium that is not only positively correlated with the expected exchange 
rate change but also  shows even higher positive correlations when diffidence is high. 
Mainstream (representative-investor) asset-pricing models, where the pricing kernel exhibits little 
variation over time, are unlikely to produce such patterns (see for example Hollifield and Uppal, 
1997), but it is of  course impossible to prove that no model of the risk premium can produce the 
required pattern. All we can do is test specific models. The one we consider is the Bansal (1997) 
asymmetric risk-premium model which, uniquely to date, does predict the required strong 
positive correlation between expectation and risk premium under some circumstances, and has 
obtained empirical support from USD-based rates. We find no traces of an asymmetric risk 
premium in our data: in the entire sample, the results flatly contradict Bansal's predictions, and 
even in a sUbsample with low discounts in the private BCU (that is, tentatively, with low Peso 
risk) there is little or no evidence in favor or against the asymmetric risk premium. Thus, our 
measure of  market diffidence is surely not proxying for an asymmetric risk premium. 
The second robustness check starts from the idea that Peso risk, if  present, may have two 
components: the standard type, namely fears of re-alignments within the system, and the risk of 
a major confidence crisis (and the resulting loss of value) in the private BCU itself. If we can 
eliminate one of these risks, and if  we then find that the patterns in the COF betas are weakened, 
then we have an indication that the eliminated Peso factor did contribute to the patterns we 
Olin line with the general approach in finance, we define the percentage risk premium as the expectation minus 
the forward premium, which is the negative of Fama (1983)'s definition. Using a short-hand notation B for the 
time series of expectations, F for the forward premia, and R for the risk premia, we have F =  B - R, and therefore 
(assuming efficiency) ~  = [var(E) - cov(B,R)]/[var(E) -cov(E,R) + var(R)]. Peso Risk in the ECU  page 3 
observ  ed.  The type of Peso risk that is easy to eliminate is the risk of a confidence crisis in the 
private ECU: just consider rates against the official ECU rather than against the private one. We 
fmd that, in these regressions, the patterns suggested by the Peso view are still present, but are 
weakened indeed. This suggests that the Peso risk of a meltdown of the private ECU  has 
contributed to the patterns detected in the first-pass tests. 
The third robustness check verifies whether the patterns we have seen are, in fact, due to 
transaction-cost effects. Huisman et ai. (1997) argue that, conditional on forward premia being 
large, the COF beta should be much closer to unity. As periods of unrest are conceivably also 
periods with larger dispersion in forward premia, our measure of diffidence may simply have 
proxied for Huisman et ai.'s transaction-cost effect. Our tests confirm that large forward premia 
are associated with algebraically larger betas. However, the patterns are much weaker than the 
ones we see in our main tests; and, worse, even the "large" betas remain negative. To sort out this 
mess, we then consider a subsample that is characterized by low discounts in the private ECU 
(that is, tentatively, little or no Peso risk). In this subsample, it turns out, there is no relation 
between the absolute size of the forward premia and the discount in the private ECU,  so that 
contamination between Peso risk (if any) and transaction-cost effects (if  any) cannot occur; also, 
when we further split up this subsample into high- and low-forward-premium sections, the 
difference between the regressor variances across these sections is unusually high, which should 
make a transaction-cost effect easy to detect. Still, we fmd no traces of a transaction-cost effect. 
Rather, it appears that the relation between COF betas and the size of  forward premia, as observed 
in the entire sample, is spurious, caused by the latter proxying for Peso risk rather than the other 
way around. 
The paper is structured as follows. Section I describes the relation between the private 
and official ECUs, conceptually as well as statistically. In Section II we provide the standard UEH 
tests of Cumby-Obstfeld and Fama, and we show the dismal results of these tests improve the 
more of the high-diffidence data points are dummied out. In Section III we provide the three 
robustness tests. Section IV concludes. 
I.  The ECU Market 
In this section, we briefly review the private ECU and its relation to the official one. We then 
study the deviations between their two spot values, discuss two possible explanations (a regular 
covariance-risk premium or Peso risks), and provide some preliminary empirical tests of  the two 
competing views. 
1.1.  The Private and official ECU: A Qualitative Discussion. 
Since the early eighties, lenders and borrowers have been able to do money-market operations or 
forward contracts in private ECUs; soon afterwards, investors could also trade Eurobonds and UK Peso Risk in the EGU  page 4 
treasury bills denominated in private ECU, futures contracts on ECU interest rates, and options on 
the private ECU itself. Despite the popularity of these products, there has been  some 
confusion regarding the nature of the private ECU and its relation to the official ECU.  In this 
section we review that relationship. 
The official ECU was just a unit of account that was used by ECIEU institutions and its 
member governments when dealing with the Community. The value of one official ECU relative 
to a base currency b was defmed to be equal to the value of  a basket containing known quantities 
nj of each of twelve currencies j: 
12  . 
SKt '"  ~ nj  Sh,t . 
j=1 
(1) 
where sb refers to a spot value of currency j in units of an arbitrarily chosen base currency b, 
and the (upper-case) superscript E refers to the official BCU. 
Being a pure unit of account, the official ECU was used only to determine how much was 
to be paid or received by EU institutions and governments; actual payments occurred in regular 
currency, at the prevailing exchange rate given by (1). Stated differently, the official ECU did not 
exist as a separate entity: individuals or firms could not create, buy, or sell official ECUs directly 
(that is, as distinct from the basket of currencies). In these respects, the official ECU differed 
from the private one as it existed since the late eighties. 
Although, from the beginning, the private BCU has enjoyed the moral support of the 
BC/EU Commission, it was created by private banks rather than by European institutions. 
Originally, the nature of this private BCU and its relation to the official basket was quite clear. In 
the early days, a bank that accepted an BCU deposit actually bought a strip of deposits in the 
different currencies, with the weights of the deposits being designed so as to payout one unit of 
the official basket at the time of expiration. In addition, the BCU clearing banks' policy was, quite 
logically, to set the spot price per BCU at (or close to) the value of the official BCU.  The 
equilibrium BCU interest rate was then computed as a (harmonic) weighted average of the rates 
on the component currencies, using a Law-of-One-Price argument like the one spelled out in 
Appendix A. In those days, also the accounting treatment of the private BCU reflected the then-
prevailing nature of the private BCU. Specifically, since in the beginning private BCU deposits or 
loans were really combinations of money market positions in each of the component currencies, 
and since the BCU was not a recognized currency for reporting or prudential purposes, any 
private-BCU deposit or loan was originally shown, in the bank's books, as a series of N deposits 
or loans. 
The private BCU did become a truly separate entity only in the mid-eighties when, 
following an initiative from the BC Commission, BCU deposits and loans were allowed to be 
booked as one single accounting entry in a category of its own (as if the BCU were an actual Peso Risk in the ECU  pageS 
currency), not as a bundle of twelve accounting entries in separate currencies. As of then, ECUs 
could be bought and sold directly between investors and banks, or among investors, without any 
need to (un)bundle the deposit or loan from (or into) the component currencies. This innovation 
made eminent sense from a transaction-cost point of view, but potentially impaired the link 
between the values of the private ECU and the basket. For various reasons that are beyond the 
scope of this paper,2 around 1987 all ECU clearing banks except Kredietbank discontinued their 
efforts to keep the value of the private ECU close to par. In November 1988, also Kredietbank 
threw in the towel, as its long position in ECU (and its prudentially required matching short 
position in the basket) had become unacceptably high. As of then, premia and discounts 
emerged that could no longer be explained by transaction costs. In the next section, we describe 
these discounts and look for possible explanations. 
1.2  A History of the discount in the Private ECU 
Our data are weekly spot rates and 3-month LIBOR interest rates,3  17/11/89-to-6/2/98 (418 
observations), all taken from Datastream. Figure 1 provides a time-series plot of the week-by-
week private-to-official  (P/O)  premium.  For symmetry, this premium is measured as  a 
continuously compounded percentage deviation: 
stt 
Pt = lnsr . 
b,t 
(2) 
In (2), the lower-case superscript (e) refers to the private ECU, the upper-case superscript E refers 
to the official ECU, and the subscript b refers to an arbitrary base currency. 
<Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here> 
From the graph we see that there was only one period of pronounced positive deviations. 
This Ecuphoric period, starting mid-l990 and culminating in a +0.8% premium in January 
1991, was the time of the emerging consensus that eventually produced the Maastricht Treaty. A 
few months before the actual signing, end 1991, of the Treaty, the market had already become 
more level-headed, and during the last weeks of 1991 uncertainty grew when Denmark and 
France announced referenda. Things turned decidedly ugly when, in June 1992, the Danish 
referendum rejected Maastricht, and especially in September 1992, when successful speculation 
against the FIM and SEK spilled over into the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM), with the familiar 
disastrous consequences. Investor diffidence showed up in a 1.6% discount in the private-ECU 
spot rate. Calm returned soon, but this regained optimism soon proved to be premature. During 
the second wave of distrust with respect to the ERM-in the summer of 1993, culminating in the 
2See e.g. Sercu (1999) for a review of the institutional background. 
Yrhe three-month horizon is the only one for which interest rates are available for all twelve currencies that form 
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virtual suspension of  the ERM - the spot ECU dropped 1.8% below par at its worst, and remained 
about 1 to 1.5 percent below par until October 1993. Early 1994, when by and large the intra-
ERM cross rates had returned to their pre-l992 levels, also ECU spot rates returned close to par. 
Again, the interlude turned out to be brief. As of  February 1994, the private ECU started a 
long (but irregular) decline, culminating in an unprecedented 3% discount relative to the basket 
in March 1996. Unlike the 1992 and 1993 episodes, this period did not coincide with marked 
turmoil in the ERM exchange markets. Rather, 1994-1996 corresponds to the period of growing 
doubts about the Maastricht scenario in general. Among the public, the EC was perceived to be 
overly bureaucratic and meddlesome, and suffering from a  "democratic deficit", and many 
Germans opposed the common currency. The tide could be stemmed only slowly, with the BC 
(or, later on, the EU) re-emphasizing the subsidiarity principle and the Kohl-Chirac tandem 
relentlessly supporting the EMU.  Additional factors, especially as of 1996, were the strong 
convergence among ERM-members' interest and inflation rates and the increasing confidence in 
the eventual advent of the common currency. In the last quarter of 1997, the private ECU even 
traded slightly above par. a situation that had not occurred for four years. 
The relation between the size of  the discount and the problems in the EMU suggests that 
the P/O discount can be interpreted as a general indicator of  investor diffidence. Such mistrust 
could be related to realignment risk (in member currencies' rates against the official ECU); 
however, the discount could also indicate risk of a collapse of the private ECU relative to the 
official one. We address this issue in the next section. 
1.3.  What may have driven the deviations from par? 
We just saw that most deviations (and all of the major ones) were discounts. To detect the 
possible reasons for a discount, we consider a standard pricing equation, 
(3) 
where re,t,T  denotes the private-Ecu riskfree rate, and Et(Rt,t,T) the required return. This 
equation points out three factors that, each in itself, could have explained a discount. FIrst, the 
private-Ecu riskfree rate, re,t,T, may typically have been too low to ensure parity. Second, the 
expected future value of  the private ECU, Et(St,T), may have been below par, even for a distant 
horizon T. Third, a standard risk premium may have driven the required return, Et(Rl;,t,T), above 
the private-ECU riskfree rate. We consider each of  these three explanations in turn. 
The first potential explanation of the discounts is that there may have been chronic 
shortfalls in interest rates on the private ECU relative to the theoretical interest rate that would 
have been consistent with permanent parity (see Appendix A). There is no support for this in our 
interest-rate data. Figure 2 shows that, as of the second quarter of 1994 (the end of  the turmoil Peso Risk in the ECU  page 7 
around the suspension of the ERM), three-month interest rates stayed quite close to the values 
consistent with permanent parity.4 For the preceding period, November 1989 to end March 
1994, the graph actually reveals a strongly negative correlation (-0.667) between spot-rate and 
interest-rate deviations: the deeper the BCU spot value dropped, the more the actual rate rose 
above the theoreticallevel.s Thus, the discounts in the private BCU were surely not caused by 
shortfalls in the interest earned on BCUs relative to the theoretical rate; rather, they occurred in 
spite of  above-normal interest rates. 
A  second possible explanation of this discount is that it may reflect a regular risk 
premium, stemming from covariance with the representative investor's marginal utility. If  risk 
premia are the sole sources of  deviations, then the hypothesis must be that the market knows that 
the two BCUs will ultimately converge, but most of the time the private BCU needs a higher 
expected return than the official one. The problem with this view is that there are no obvious 
theoretical grounds why the private BCU should have had higher covariance risks most of the 
time. True, given such a higher-risk assumption, any setback in  the monetary unification process 
would imply a longer time-to-convergence of both BCUs; but since the difference in covariance-
with-a-kemel risk cannot be very large, one would need disconcertingly sharp changes in the 
expected waiting time to explain the fluctuations we observe in the PIO premium. 
Lastly, the discount may have reflected the Peso-type risk of a major confidence crisis in 
the private BCU, a currency that for most of its life had a rather uncertain legal status. The 
sources of  legal uncertainty were many. FIrst and foremost, against the expectations at the time 
the currency was created, as of the late 80s the BCU clearing banks proved unable to maintain 
parity between both ECUs. Thus, investors suddenly woke up to the fact that the relation with the 
official ECU was (at best) based on trust. True, it was always perceived that, if  and when the 
common currency would be introduced, the private BCU would become assimilated with the 
common currency (the ECU, later renamed into Euro). In  addition, it always seemed quite likely 
that, if  the common-currency plans would fail, the ECIEU would still avoid the embarrassment of 
a meltdown of the private BCU-after all, the instrument was created at the instigation of the 
Commission, and the BC  institutions were ostentatious early investors in that market. But, 
however likely the eventual re-convergence to parity, for a long time there was no iron-clad 
guarantee. For instance, until 1994 the terms and conditions of  private-BCu bonds did not even 
include explicit provisions for conversion, at par, of private-BCU liabilities into the common 
currency if  and when the currency would be introduced. Likewise, the assimilation of  the private 
ECU with the common currency was formally laid down as late as 1996, the time when the new 
4Not surprisingly, this was also the case prior to October 1989, the period of intervention in the private-BCU 
market (not shown in the graph). 
5rhe finding of correlation between the levels is robust to possible unit-root properties: while for first differences 
the correlation is a mere -0.04, there is a cross-correlation of -0.41 when the change in the PIO premium is 
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name (Euro) was agreed upon. And even then doubts still existed whether the Euro would ever 
materialize, or, if  so, whether, say, us courts would accept the conversion of private ECUs (and 
other Euroland currencies) into Euros. In short, a catastrophic confidence crisis and loss of 
value, however improbable, could never be quite ruled out. In actual fact, of course, such a 
meltdown has not occurred-but this is ex post. If  there was a Peso-type risk indeed, these 
hindsight observations would just reflect the most likely outcome rather than the entire ex-ante 
distribution. 
Two qualifying remarks are in order. FIrst, while the distinction between risk premia and 
Peso risks is clear-cut in a representative-investor model (where risks and their price change 
only slowly), that distinction becomes blurred in more complicated models, where risk premia 
are potentially much more time-varying. Thus, it is impossible to say, at this stage, whether the 
P/O premium captures Peso risk, or unorthodoxly sharp fluctuations in the risk premium, or 
both. For this reason, we initially use the more agnostic term "diffidence", covering both Peso 
risk and markedly changing risk premia. Qualitative evidence in favor of a "diffidence" 
interpretation of  the discount in the private ECU is provided by its strong relation with setbacks 
in the monetary unification process-the Danish No-vote, the ERM crises in 1992 and 1993, and 
the 1995-6 period of  general disaffection with the Maastricht plans. These events are logically 
associated with higher Peso probabilities and/or higher risk premia. A  second caveat is that 
exchange rates for the private ECU contain not just the private-ECU factor, but also factors related 
to each of  the base currencies. As deep discounts in the private ECU also coincided with periods 
of  distrust in the ERM, we need to keep in mind that Peso risk, if  any, is quite likely to pick up 
also the standard type of  Peso event, realignment-risk. In  short, market diffidence (as proxied for 
by the P/O premium) may cover sharply rising risk premia, the risk of  an (unlikely) meltdown of 
the private BCU, and realignment risk. In Section II we proceed under the assumption that Peso 
risk is the main factor behind the P/O premium. Section ill  provides additional support for this 
view. 
n.  Main Tests for Peso Effects 
8.1.  Standard Tests of the Unbiased Expectations Hypothesis 
To set the stage for our tests of  the risk-premium and Peso theories, we first provide the results 
for the standard Cumby-Obstfeld-Fama (COF) regression test of the unbiased expectations 
hypothesis, 
st,t,H.1 =  (lb + fJb FPt,t,t+.1 + llb,t,H.1  .  (4) 
The observations are weekly, as before. As, for reasons of  data availability, our interest rates are 
three-monthly, we use. in our OLS regressions, the Hansen and Hodrick's (1980) standard Peso Risk in the ECU  page 9 
deviations to cope with the overlap in the holding-period returns. As we have many equations in 
this paper, each estimated (often rather imprecisely) over eleven separate currencies6 and four 
periods, we have condensed the estimation results of  each equation into a few key statistics: the 
mean slope coefficient across all eleven currencies, the number of estimates that exceed unity, the 
number above [below] zero, and the number of  significantly positive [negative] coefficients. The 
original equation-by-equation results are available on request. 
Table 1. Summary of main regression results (I) 
st,t,t+A  =  <lb + f}b  FPt,t,t+A + TJb,t,t+A 
meanf}  #>1  #>0  whereof 
Sample Period  signif5% 
Total (Oct 98 to Feb 98)  -0.65  1  3  1 
I (Oct 98 to Aug 92)  -0.31  3  5  1 
II (Sept 92 to Dec 94)  0.68  4  6  3 
III (Jan 95 to Feb 98)  -0.70  4  4  1 
#<1.)  whereof 
signif5% 
8  0 
6  2 
5  0 
7  1 
Key to Table 1. The table summarizes results from 11  regressions, one for each base currency b (BEF, DEM, 
NLG, PTE, ITL, IEP, GRD, DKK, ESP, GBP, FRF). The regressand is the three-month percentage spot-rate 
change for the private ECU, Sb,t,HA, the regressor is the beginning-of-period three-month forward premium, 
FPt,t,t+A. In the regressions we follow Hansen and Hodrick (1980), that is, OLS with standard deviations that 
take into account the overlap in the holding periods. 
The summary statistics for equation (4) are shown in  Table 1. In terms of their mean, the 
slope coefficients in Table 1 are hardly better than the meta-average (--0.80) reported by Froot 
and Thaler: across the eleven f} coefficients estimated from our total sample, the average is -0.65 
for private-ECU rates. Among the regression coefficients for rates against the private ECU, only 
one individual coefficient exceeds  unity,  and eight are even below zero (although not 
significantly so). The subperiod results are similar. In terms of the mean, the only noteworthy 
exception occurs in the (relatively short and noisy) second period. However, even for that period 
the numbers of coefficients exceeding unity or zero are hardly better; and the more recent data 
(subperiod III) again display the familiar picture of  predominantly negative coefficients. 
In their review of the literature, Froot and Thaler (1990) discuss three candidate 
explanations of the forward-bias puzzle that would be consistent with rational expectations: (i) 
risk premia, (ii) the need to learn about changing economic circumstances, and (iii) Peso 
problems. While it is known that a risk premium should obscure the relationship between 
exchange rate changes and forward premia, the observed bias is much larger than conventional 
risk theories predict. To our knowledge, only Bansal (1997)'s model has achieved some success 
in this area. We test this model in Section III. The need to leam about a change in, for instance, 
6As the BEF and LUF always trade at par, we treat them as one currency. Peso Risk in the ECU  page 10 
monetary policy,  should be a  temporary phenomenon.  More in general, while  errors in 
expectations may explain coefficients below unity, it is hard to see how they could have induced 
pervasively negative coefficients across all currencies and time periods. Thus, we initially focus 
on Peso problems. 
ll.2  Testing for Peso Risk in Rates against the Private ECU 
Assume that there is a Peso risk (here, a sudden loss of confidence in the private BCU and/or 
realignment risk). Such a feature can explain the negative coefficients that we have observed if, 
sufficiently often, the forward rate points into the direction of a low-probability but major event 
that is never, or hardly ever, observed in smallish samples. In general, the problem with this view 
is that it invokes a factor-deviations between the true expectation and the small-sample mean-
that is as hard to observe as an unspecified risk premium. To lend credibility to this Peso-
explanation, we need an independent indicator of the degree of Peso risk, so that we can verify 
whether the negative relationship between prediction and outcome actually is more likely when 
Peso risk is higher. The advantage of  our data set is that a plausible candidate indicator is readily 
available, namely the discount in the private ECU. 
We have already mentioned circumstantial evidence that such a Peso-mechanism, if 
present in the data, might be associated with the discount in the private ECU. Recall that there is a 
strong negative correlation between the P/O premium and the difference between the interest rate 
on private BCUs and the average interest rate of the component currencies (Section 1.3). Thus, 
when negative news about the private BCU reaches the market, not only the spot rate falls, but 
also the private-BCU interest rate rises relative to other interest rates-that is, the forward 
premium typically predicts a further drop of the private BCU.  Now bring in Peso risk. If  the 
expectation imbedded in this  higher forward premium is systematically negated by  the 
subsequent return, then the forward discount is typically followed by an appreciation of the 
private ECU, and the beta is negative. 
To formally verify whether the negative empirical relationship is indeed due to episodes 
of  deep PIO discounts-that is, tentatively, episodes of high Peso risk-we condition the betas 
on the degree of discount on the private BCU. The technique is borrowed from Bilson (1981) 
and Huisman et at. (1997), who hypothesize that the regression relation may be different 
conditional on a large forward premium (Bilson) or a large variance in the day's cross-section of 
forward premia (Huisman et  al.). Accordingly, they estimate the regression of  the type 
e  e  .\  e 
Sb,t,HA  = <lb +  ~bl [lb,t x  FPb,t,t+A1 + ~bO [(1-Ib,u x  FPb,t,t+A1 + 1]b,t,HA,  (5) 
where Ib,t is set equal to unity if  observation t is characterized by a high premium (Bilson) or a 
high cross-sectional dispersion (Huisman et al.). Analogously, we estimate (5) and set Ib.t equal 
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where the percentage N is consecutively set at 1  %, 5%, 10%, 20%, and 40%. If  the PIO premium 
is related to Peso risk, then observations where the private ECU is closer to par should be less 
affected by the Peso effect, while the deep-discount data should be more strongly affected. Thus, 
Peso-risk (as proxied for by the  size of the  PIO  premium)  has  the  following  testable 
implications. First, for any given cut-off criterion (1 %,5%, etc.) the beta for the deep-discount 
data points should be algebraically smaller (for instance, more negative) than the beta of the 
closer-to-par observations, because these deep-discount data have higher Peso risks. Second, 
when we make the definition of a deep discount more stringent (going, for instance, from a 40-
percent percentile cut-off criterion to a one-percent percentile criterion), both sets of betas should 
drop steadily.7 The reason is that, in either sample, Peso risk gets more weight: the higher-risk 
sample becomes less and less diluted by medium-risk data, while the smaller-risk sample 
contains more and more medium-risk data. 
<Insert Table 2 about here> 
Panel A of Table 2, also illustrated graphically in the left-hand-side part of Figure 3, 
bears out these hypotheses. First, for any given cut-off criterion the average large-discount betas 
are invariably below the small-discount betas and the number of negative slopes is systematically 
larger in the deep-discount sample. Second, when going down the table (that is, making the 
criterion of a "large" discount more severe) we see that both sets of average betas drop steadily, 
reaching a highly negative -7.56 for the one-percent deepest-discount observations. For the 
deep-discount sample, where all but one estimate are already negative with the weakest cut-off 
value (40%), we of  course see no trend in the number of  negative betas; but such a trend is very 
clear in the small-discount sample, where the number of negative slopes steadily rises from four 
to eight as we tighten the high-risk cut-off criterion. All this is consistent with the Peso-risk 
hypothesis. Equally interesting, for both the 20- and 4O-percent cutoff criteria the small-discount 
betas are, on average, positive. That is, if we classify observations on the basis of the PIO 
deviation, then the negative slopes in the standard COF regression tum out to be generated by 
less than 20 percent of  the data points. This is what one would expect in light of the results from 
unconditional tests. 
7Thus, the high- and low-risk betas are not necessarily centered around the unconditional beta. The unconditional 
beta is a  weighted average of (i) the conditional betas and (ii) the beta of the conditional means, with as 
respective weights the contributions of  the conditional variances and the variance of the conditional means to the 
total variance of the regressor. If the conditional means differ across the subsamples, then a fall of one of the 
conditional betas is not necessarily accompanied by a rise in the other one. Conversely, if both conditional betas 
fall, then by implication the beta of  the conditional means must rise. 
An alternative test design might have been Non-Linear LS where the beta as a function of the PIO premium. 
However, the potential non-stationarity of the PIO premium (Section 11.3)  would make the t-tests hard to 
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Figure 3: Average regression coefficients 
for deep-discount versus smaIl-discount observations 
mtes against the private ECU  mtes against the private ECU 
- mean coefficients for deep-discount data 
- - - mean coefficients for smaller-discount data 
Key to Figure 3: We define a data point to be deep-discount if  it belongs to the 1  % (5, 10, 20, 40%) most 
negative discounts in the sample. The bold line shows the average beta for deep-discount data points, the regular 
line the average beta for smaller-discount data, in the regressions from Table 2 
m.  Three Corroborating Tests 
While the above evidence is consistent with the PIO premium proxying for a Peso-type risk, also 
other factors may have explained the empirical results. In  this section we critically discuss some 
alternative explanations.  Before turning to theories that require additional tests, we ftrst dispell 
the notion that our empirical results are due to a few obsetvations, or to a particular time period. 
The critical reader may have noted, from the time series plots of spot and interest mtes, 
that there are two outlier obsetvations that superbly confonn to the Peso theory. In both the fall 
of  92 and the summer of  93, the private ECU dipped dmmatically and BCU interest mtes soared 
above the weighted avemge of  the EMS mtes-that is, forward mtes predicted worse to come. In 
actual fact, both times the spot mte sharply returned towards par. Could these two outlier 
episodes dominate the results? We argue they cannot. FIrst, if  the two outliers were behind the 
results, then imposing stricter and stricter defInitions of  a "large" FP would not have affected the 
small-FP betas. That is, the fact that both the small- and large-FP betas drop when we raise the 
cut-off point means that the obsetvations between, say, the 60th and 80th percentile value, seem 
to be more risky than those below the 60th percentile and less risky than those above the 80th. 
Second, if  the 93-93 two outliers would dominate the sample, they should have had a serious 
impact on the COP regressions in the middle subperiod results. Table 1 however show that this is 
not at all the case; in fact, in that subperiod the COF regressions do somewhat better than 
avemge. A similar argument can be invoked against the view that the deep PIO-discount sample 
may just proxy for a particular time period where an unidentifted factor may have driven the 
results. If  so, this subperiod would be the third subperiod where, as Graph 2 shows, the private Peso Risk in the ECU  page 13 
ECU traded at systematically low prices. Yet, the COF tests summarized in Table 1 reveal no 
extraordinary behavior for that subperiod. 
We now turn to other theories, like asymmetric risk premia or transaction costs, that 
require additional tests. 
IH.l  Is the PIO Premium proxying for an Asymmetric Risk Premium? 
In the preceding sections, we have ignored the possibility that changes in the PIO premium may 
capture sharply fluctuating risk premia. Thus, risk premia lead to negative COF betas provided 
that they are strongly positively correlated with expectations (see footnote 1). As Fama (1983) 
already remarks, such a phenomenon is hard to explain in general. In view of  our test results, the 
risk-premium hypothesis becomes even harder to understand: we now need a theory that 
explains why this positive correlation mainly exists when the PIO premium is high. 
Of  course, the risk-premium hypothesis is, at its most general level, irrefutable; all one 
can do is test specific models. For example, Hollifield and Uppal (1997) reject that the COF 
betas are generated by a model of  the Dumas (1991) type, a general-equilibrium model with an 
endogenous risk premium. In this paper, we consider a model, due to Bansal (1997), which does 
predict strong variation in the risk premium and has received empirical support in uso-based 
data. Starting from pricing-kernel interest-rate theory, Bansal argues that the risk premium may 
be approximately quadratic in the interest rate differential, thus producing negative COF 
coefficients for positive forward premia and vice versa. He accordingly conditions the COF 
regression coefficient on the sign of  the forward premium rather than its absolute size, and does 
fmd that negative forward premia go together with positive betas and vice versa. 
We first replicate the Bansal tests on our data. Panel B of  Table 2 contains the results. 
On the bright side (from Bansal's perspective), the average P  for positive premia is doing 
particularly badly indeed (-3.52). However, upon closer inspection of  the individual slopes (not 
shown) this figure turns out to be driven by one extreme outlier, -34.33 for the DEM, a 
coefficient generated by a mere six observations (out of 417); deleting this outlier actually 
switches the mean to a positive 1.46, which is against Bansal's predictions. Equally against the 
theory, the average P  for negative-forward-premia observations is below zero rather than above 
zero (-0.92; -0.80 without the DEM). The tallies of negative individual coefficients in each 
subsample suggests the same pattern: when forward premia are negative, betas should be 
positive, but in actual fact this is observed in two cases only - which is even less than the number 
obtained when premia are positive. In  short, we fmd no support for the Bansal hypothesis. 
This fmding suggests that the results of our tests for Peso-effects, in Section 11.2, are 
quite unlikely to be caused by PIO premia proxying for Bansal-type risk premia. However, the 
opposite may still be true: Peso effects may be obscuring the Bansal risk premia. To verify 
whether Bansal's view fares better when we control for Peso risk, we do a four-way split of  the Peso Risk in the ECU  page 14 
sample: we first dichotomize the data on the basis of the P/O premium (using the 40th-percentile 
criterion, so as to have enough data in each subsample), and we then subdivide each sample on 
the basis of the sign of the forward premium. We are particularly interested in the cells with 
smaller P/O discounts, where peso risk (if  any) should be weaker and the transaction-cost effect 
more visible. The results in Panel A of Table 3 show that, once Peso risk is removed, the 
contradictions with Bansal's result are lessened. In accordance with the Bansal effect we see that, 
given that the P/O is small, positive FPs are associated with negative average betas and vice versa. 
The average coefficient for negative forward premia in the absence of Peso risk, around 0.90, 
would definitely please supporters of the UEH view. However, in this test the numbers of positive 
and negative betas do not confirm the evidence from the means: behind the positive average there 
are only four positive individual estimates, which is less than the number of positive betas behind 
the negative average that we observe when FPs are positive. Thus, even after controlling for 
(tentatively) Peso risk there is no strong evidence of an asymmetric risk premium. 
To sum up:  the evidence of our first-pass tests provide flatly contradicts the Bansal 
prediction. While, after controlling for the P/O premium, these contradictions disappear, there 
still is no firm evidence of an asymmetric risk premium.  Thus, we reject the notion that the P/O 
premium may have proxied for a Bansal-type risk premium. Pending the arrival of other risk-
premium models that predict a strong positive correlation between expectation and risk premium, 
we tend to retain the Peso-risk explanation.8 
Ill.2.  Testing the Effect of Eliminating One Type of  Peso Risk 
In the literature, Peso risk stands for the small risk of  large changes, like realignments. As stated 
before, the private ECU might have been subject to another Peso-type risk, a possible collapse of 
the private ECU. In this section we first provide empirical indications that the latter type of risk 
has existed. We then test whether this type of risk has contributed to the general beta-patterns 
we have observed in Section ll. If  so, this would further lend credibility to our contention that the 
patterns have to do with Peso risk. 
To obtain a clue as to whether the risk of a collapse of the private ECU market was 
entirely absent, or at least one of the factors in the P/O premium, we can resort to unit-root tests. 
The complete absence of  a Peso-type melt-down risk means that eventual convergence between 
the private and official ECUs is a certainty. Thus, in that view the discount would be a temporary 
phenomenon and cannot have a unit root. Conversely, the presence of a unit root must have 
meant that there was a Peso risk in the private ECU relative to the official one. Figure 1 already 
Sorhe discrepancy between our and Bansal's test results could of course be due to a different sample, but also to 
the fact that Bansal's theory refers to two distinct economies. In our case, the (relative) risk of the private ECU 
cannot be related to the (relative) risk of a particular economy. At most, the private ECU is related to the official 
one, which, in turn, refers to a group of economies. Peso Risk in the ECU  pagelS 
suggests that the P/O premium exhibits strong persistence indeed. Table 4 provides Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Phillips-Perron (pp) test statistics on the P/O premium. The pp test 
rejects the unit-root hypothesis, but only at the 10% level (and very marginally so). Judging by 
the ADF statistic, in contrast, the hypothesis of a unit root is quite acceptable. We conclude that 
there are credible, but not quite conclusive, indications of one type of Peso-type risk, a 
potentially disastrous loss of  confidence in the private ECU. 
Table 4: ADF and pp tests for unit roots in the P/O Premium 
model  ADFt-test  PPt-test  10% critical value 
Constant, no trend  -2.1110  -2.7884  -2.75 
Constant, trend  -2.2692  -3.1557  -3.13 
Key to Table 4. The table shows Augmented Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests for the null hypothesis 
of  a unit root in the percentage difference between the values of  the private and official ECUs. The data are 418 
weekly observations from October 1989 to February 1998. 
If  the risk of a collapse of the private BCU was one source of  Peso risk (next to regular 
realignment risk), it should have affected also the modified COF regressions of  Section 11.2.  To 
verify this, we rerun the modified COF regressions (5) using, this time, exchange rates and 
forward premia against the official ECU.9 Exchange rates against the official ECU are subject to 
realignment risk, as are rates against the private ECU. But unlike the private ECU, the official ECU 
can change value only because of realignments and is not otherwise subject to possible crises of 
confidence. 
Panel C  of Table 2, shown graphically in the right-hand-side part of Figure 3, 
summarizes the results of regressions with the official-BCu data. Although the broad picture is 
similar, the effects are weaker and somewhat more blurred. As expected under the Peso 
hypothesis, for any cut-off criterion the average smaller-discount beta is algebraically below the 
deep-discount slope coefficient, and the smaIler-discount betas do drop steadily as we go down 
the table. For the deep-discount betas, however, which should be most sensitive to Peso risk, the 
drop in the average coefficients is less steady, and does not nearly go as far as what we found in 
the case of exchange rates against the private ECU. Also the trends in the numbers of  negative 
coefficients are weaker in Panel B than in Panel A. All this again suggests that the difference 
between both sets of data-risk about the future P/O deviation-may have added a Peso risk of 
its own. 
9porward rates for the official ECU are not directly observable, but they follow from the component CUlTencies' 
forward rates using the no-arbittage condition (A.3) in the Appendix. Peso Risk in the ECU  page 16 
m. 3  Is the P/O Premium proxying for Transaction-Cost Effects? 
To put our results into perspective, we also compare them to results from similar tests that sort 
the data on either the absolute size of  the fOlWard premium (rather than on the PIO premium), as 
in Huisman et al. (1997). This test starts from the fact that real-world markets are subject to 
friction. As a result of such transaction and information costs, uncovered interest arbitrage 
cannot perfectly align expected exchange rates and fOlWard  premia. Most of the time, 
expectations of exchange rate changes are, moreover, so small that this friction-induced noise 
between expectations and premia largely obscures the potential relation between the two. 
However, there may be occasions where the market does expect large changes; and if  the impact 
of  friction is essentially unaffected by the size of  the expected change, then in these instances the 
signal-to-noise ratio is relatively large. Highly positive or negative fOlWard premia should, 
therefore, be better predictors than small premia. Cast in familiar statistical terms: the COF 
regression suffers from a standard errors-in-the-regressor bias towards zero, and for a given 
variance of  the noise term this bias can be reduced by constructing a sample where the variance 
of  the regressor is larger. 
To test this view, we again run regression (5), this time setting Ib.t equal to unity 
whenever, in terms of  the absolute value of  the fOlWard premium, the observation exceeds the 1  % 
(or 5, 10, 20, 40%) upper percentile. The Huisman et at.  predictions are similar to our 
hypotheses Te Peso-risk: for any given cut-off value the large-FP coefficient should be closer to 
unity than the smaller-FP one; and the stricter the cut-off value, the closer to unity the large-FP 
coefficients should be. In addition, the large-FP beta should be close to unity, or at least positive. 
Panel D of  Table 2 contains the results. These are not encouraging: while average large-
premium coefficients are systematically larger, algebraically, than smaller-premium ones, the 
effect is not nearly as strong as the one we documented for a sort on the size of the PIO discount. 
Also, the negative trending in the average coefficients is less pronounced, and the non-parametric 
support for such negative trending, from the numbers of negative estimates, is weaker (for the 
large-FP samples) or even entirely absent (for the small-FP samples). The most damning 
information, however, is that almost all average coefficients remain negative. The lonely 
exception, for the one-percent largest fOlWard premia, remains far from unity (0.17), and behind 
this mean value there still are six negative coefficients.1o Equally disconcerting, when we sort on 
the basis of  the size of the fOlWard premium we need to discard more than 95 percent of  the data 
points before we get a positive coefficient. In light of the unconditional cross-sectional tests, 
where there is a strong positive relation between mean exchange rate changes and fOlWard 
premia, this finding would implausibly mean that the cross-sectional evidence is due to very few 
10Jiuisman et al. (1997) do obtain coefficients close to unity for very strict definitions of high premia; for the 
extreme fractiles. their coefficient even exceeds unity. However. from Nissen (1996). these results disappear when 
their numeraire-invariance constraint is dropped; and that constraint is rejected by the data. Peso Risk in the ECU  page 17 
data points. In contrast, when sorting on the basis of the PIO discount we needed to discard less 
than 20 percent of  the observations to fmd back that positive relationship. 
The prevalence of  negative coefficients, and the absence of coefficients close to unity, is 
inconsistent with the pure errors-in-the-regressor argument; rather, there must have been another 
factor at work, like Peso risk. Peso risk may have affected the results of our transaction-cost 
tests in two ways. First, there may have been an transaction-cost effect on top of  the Peso-bias. 
Such an addition of  Peso risk on top of a transaction-cost effect would explain why the betas in 
Panel D of  Table 2 are too low but seem to have, otherwise, the predicted pattern. The second 
possible view is that the patterns reported in Panel C are spurious because forward premia 
simply proxy for PIO discounts.l1 
To gain some insight into the a priori credibility of  the second explanation, we compute 
the Spearman rank correlation (SRC) between the PIO premium and IFPI. Over the entire sample, 
the SRC is typically weak (the average is -0.04, with five positive individual coefficients), but the 
correlations also seem to vary substantially depending on the size of the PIO premium. To 
preserve enough observations in the subsamples to be formed in later tests, we again use the 
40% cutoff value for the discount in the private ECU to form a high- and a low-risk subsample, 
and we compute SRCs within each subsample. We find that, conditional on a deep discount the 
average SRC is nontrivial and negative (-0.29, with eight negative individual values), while in the 
smaller-discount sample there is virtually no link between the rankings (the average SRC is just 
0.04, with five negative coefficients). This correlation pattern implies the following testable 
implications: 
•  If  the Peso effect is genuine and the transaction effect entirely spurious (that is, merely 
caused by correlation between both ranking criteria), then if  we sort on the basis of  forward 
premia we should see virtually no symptoms of a transaction-cost effect within the low-
Peso-risk sample; and the transaction-effect symptoms within the high-Peso-risk sample 
should be weaker than the raw Peso effect of  Table 2A because the proxying is far from 
perfect 
•  In contrast, if  there is a genuine transaction effect on top of  the Peso-effect, then we should 
observe symptoms of a transaction-cost effect within both the high- and low-Peso-risk 
samples.12 
II  A third possible view would be that the symptoms of Peso risk are the spurious ones, and the transaction-
effect genuine. This view is discarded. First, the negative signs in Table 2A and 3D cannot be explained by errors 
in variables, but could be due to a Peso effect Second, the symptoms of Peso effects are stronger than those of 
transaction cost effects, which is implausible if the ranking on PIO is an imperfect proxy for the ranking on IFPI. 
12Ceteris paribus, this hypothesis also predicts stronger symptoms in the high-risk sample, because the genuine 
transaction-cost effect is reinforced by a proxy Peso-risk bias. However, we argue, below, that the power to detect 
transaction-cost effects in the high-risk sample is lower, which tends to invalidate this additional test criterion. Peso Risk in the ECU  pageJ8 
Table 5. Comparison of Regressor Variances Across Cells 
(a) average var(FP;  IFPI > c) and  var(FP; IFPI s c), 10-4 
(b) average of  the currency-by-currenc  V ratio of large- and small-FP variances 
criterion  5th IFPI percentile  10th IFPI percentile  20th IFPI percentile  40th IFPI percentile 
small peso risk  (a) 4.46 - 0.11  (a) 2.83 - 0.09  (a) 1.SS - o.en  (a) 0.83 - O.OS 
(b) 18.85  (b) 19.96  (b) 21.08  (b) 26.85 
large peso risk  (a) 0.34 - 0.08  (a) 0.25 - 0.06  (a) 0.31  - O.OS  (a) 0.21  - 0.03 
(b) 6.09  (b) S.74  (b)7.B4  (b) 10.14 
Key to Table S. The table shows the variance of the regressor, FP, in each of the cells, according to various 
ranking criteria "Large Peso Risk" indicates that the observation belongs to the set with the 40% deepest PIO 
discounts. Data are also ranked on the basis of the absolute size of the forward premimn, using the S% (10, 20, 
40%) percentiles as alternative cutoff values. Within each cell defined by a PIO and IFPI criterion, we show the 
variance (10-4) of the forward premia conditional on a large and on a smalllFPl, respectively. We also show the 
average of  the currency-by-currency ratio of  the high- and low-FP variances. 
For regression tests of the above hypotheses, we form four subsamples on the basis of 
two sets of  dummies-the fIrst one indicating whether or not, for observation t, the PIO premium 
belongs to the 40% deepest discounts, and the other dummy indicating whether or not the time-t 
forward premium belongs to the 40% (20,10,5%) largest13-and  we allow the regression slope 
to differ across the four cells. Prior to discussing the results, we provide some information on 
the variance of the regressor within each cell. If, for instance in the low-Peso-risk sample, the 
variability of the fOlWard premia would be low, then there would not be much of a difference 
between the subsamples of high- and low-FP data, and we would not expect to see a strong 
transaction-cost effect. Actually, as shown in Table 5, for any cut-off criterion for IFPI  the 
variance of  the regressor is systematically larger in the small-Peso-risk sample than in the high-
risk one, and so are the differences between the large-FP- and small-FP-samples' variances. Thus, 
any transaction effect present in the data should be easier to detect within the small-Peso-risk 
sample. 
Given this information, we now discuss the regression results in Table 3B. First consider 
the subsamples with smaller PIO discounts. In this subsample, peso risk should be weaker; and 
the transaction-cost effect, if  any, cannot be spurious and should be easiest to detect. Table 3B 
reveals no trace of any transaction-cost effect within the small-discount data. Against the 
predictions of  the transaction-cost view the average large-FP betas are actually always somewhat 
below the small-FP ones, and they do not trend downward when the defInition of "large FP" is 
tightened. Likewise, in these low-Peso-risk cells the large-FP betas are less often positive than 
the small-FP ones, and there is no trend in the number of positive signs when the defInition of 
"large FP" is made stricter. In short, within the subset of  small-Peso-risk observations, we do not 
l:Yrhus, the rankings are made independently. That is, we did not rank forward premia separately within the deep-
and small-discount samples, respectively. Our way of splitting the data has the advantage that the definition of a 
large forward premimn remains comparable to the one used in Panel D of  Table 2. Peso Risk in the ECU  page 19 
detect any of the symptoms of bias that could be caused by transaction costs. In contrast, in the 
high-Peso-risk subsample the large-FP betas are less negative than small-FP ones; there is some 
downward trending in the coefficients for stricter definition of "large FP", especially in the first 
cell, where discounts and FPs are both large; but the differences between large- and small-FP 
betas as well as the downward trending are much weaker than in Table 2A. Recall, lastly, that on 
the basis of  the variabilities in the forward premia any transaction-cost effect present in the data 
should be hardest to detect in the high-risk sample. In light of  all these considerations, we reject 
the view that the anomalies in Table 2D are driven by a combination of transaction-cost effects 
and Peso-biases, and we retain the hypothesis that the symptoms of transaction-cost bias are 
spurious. 
IV.  Conclusion 
We find that the forward rates against the private ECU exhibit a similar bias as other data: the 
Cumby-Obstfeld-Fama (COF) regression coefficients are systematically below unity, and mostly 
negative. To test whether Peso risks explain these results, we would like to have an indicator of 
Peso risk-here not only the risk of realignments but potentially also the (tiny) chance of a 
major crisis of confidence in the private BCU. The discount of the private BCU relative to the 
official one may provide such a measure. To gain some insight, we verify whether the size of the 
premium affects the COF coefficients in the way predicted by the Peso view:  a deeper PIO 
discount should be associated with a lower (more negative) beta. The empirical results are in line 
with the latter view. When we consider rates against the official ECU, the effect is weaker, which 
suggests that the risk of a collapse of  the private BCU may have been a source of Peso risk, next 
to standard realignment risk.14 Of course, one can never reject the hypothesis that the PIO 
premium may have proxied for sharply rising risk premia, too; all one can test is whether 
specific risk-premia models are associated with the PIO premium. We find no evidence or 
Bansal's (1997) asymmetric risk premium, a theory that does predict negative COF slopes. Even 
though, after controlling for Peso risk, the data no longer flatly contradict his hypothesis, there 
are no grounds for the hypothesis that the PIO effect is just a proxy for an asymmetric risk 
premium. Also the transaction-cost model (Huisman et at.,  1997) is particularly bad at 
generating positive betas, and the other indications in favor of  this alternative  explanation of the 
forward puzzle appear largely spurious: the size of the forward premia is proxying for the depth 
of the PIO discount. 
l"The tests for a unit root in the PIO premium, a characteristic that would be incompatible with the view that 
there is no Peso risk, provide no clear-cut evidence as to whether there were fears of  a massive confidence crisis 
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Appendix: The interest rate on a pure basket ECU 
We denote the private-BCU exchange rate (observed at time t) and the private-BCU risk-free rate 
of return (on money market operations that start at t and expire at T) by st,t and re,t.  T, 
respectively, and we add asterisks to denote a pure basket ECU, defined as one that always trades 
at par (as was the case until November 1989). Thus, by definition, 
(A. 1) 
(A.2) 
Let Ft,T denote a forward rate set at time t for delivery at time T. From (A.2) and interest rate 
parity, respectively, it then follows that 
*  N· 
Ft,t,T = Ij=l nj  F~,t,T . 
se*  l+lb.t.T  _  ~  N  n. sj  l+rb.t.T 
b,tl+r*tT - L.j=l  ~  b,t l+rJ·tT· 
e"  " 
Dividing through both sides by sg:r (1+lb,t,T) and using (A.l), we obtain 
1  _ IN  si.tnj  _1_ 15 
1 +r;,t,T  - j=l ~  N sj  .  1 +rj,t,T . 




Thus, for a pure-basket currency, the effective gross risk-free rate is a harmonic weighted mean 
of the effective gross rates on the component currencies, not a simple weighted mean as is 
sometimes thought. In practice, the difference between the simple and harmonic weighted mean 
is minor. 
ISAn alternative way to obtain (A.5) is to realize that, when (A.2) holds, then a strategy of investing amounts 
njl(1 +fj,t,T) of each currency will produce one BCU at time T. The cost of  buying this strip of  deposits, measured 
in EeUs at par (use (A.l)), is given by the right-hand side of (A.4). Lastly, by the law of One Price, the time-t 
cost, in terms of  ECUs, of  one synthetic time-T ECU must equal the left-hand side. Peso Risk in the ECU  page 2] 
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Dertig Jaar VleMo, Averbode, Belgium. Table 2. One-by-One Tests of the Competing Hypotheses on the Forward Bias 
Summary statistics on fJbl and fJbO in Sb,t,t+4  =  <1b + fJbl  [lb,t x FPt"t,t+4] + ~bO [(I-Ib,'> x FPt"t,t+4] + TJb,t,t+4 
prediction about fJ  mean  #>1  #>0  whereof  #<0  whereof  mean  #>1  #>0  whereof  #<0 
and criterion for lb t = 1  j}bl  signif5%  signif5%  PbO  signif 5% 
Peso risk I: fJ should be worse  Panel A: Exchange rates against the Private ECU; lb,t indicates deep discount 
when PIO discount is deep  j} for deep PIO discounts  I  j} for small PIO discounts 
PIO < 40% percentile  -1.76  0  1  0  10  3  0.40  2  7  1  4 
PIO < 20% percentile  -2.05  0  1  0  10  2  0.31  2  6  2  5 
PIO < 10% percentile  -2.35  1  1  0  10  1  -0.37  2  3  1  8 
PIO < 5% percentile  -5.60  0  1  0  10  4  -0.42  1  4  1  7 
PIO < 1  % percentile  -7.56  2  3  0  8  4  -0.61  1  3  1  8 
Asymmetric Risk Premium:  Panel B: Exchange rates against the Private ECU; lb,t indicates a positive premium 
fJ> «)  o  when FP < (» 0  j} for positive forward premia  j} for negative forward premia 
FP>O  -3.52  1  4  1  7  2  -0.92  1  2  0  9 
same, without DEM  1.46  1  4  1  6  1  -0.80  1  2  0  8 
Peso risk II:  fJ should be worse  Panel C: Exchange rates against the Official ECU; lb,t indicates deep discount 
when PIO discount is deep  j} for deep PIO discounts  j} for small PIO discounts 
PIO < 40% percentile  -1.86  0  2  0  9  5  0.23  2  6  2  5 
PIO < 20% percentile  -2.20  0  1  1  10  3  0.12  2  5  2  6 
PIO < 10% percentile  -2.10  0  2  0  9  1  -0.36  2  5  1  6 
PIO < 5% percentile  -4.85  0  1  0  10  2  -0.50  1  5  1  6 
PIO < 1  % percentile  -3.74  2  2  0  9  1  -0.65  1  3  1  8 
Friction: fJ should be worse  Panel D: Exchange rates against the Private ECU; lb,t indicates a large premium 
when IFPI is small  j} for small FP  I  j} for large FP 
IFPI > 99% percentile  -0.78  1  3  1  8  0  0.17  3  5  2  6 
IFPI > 95% percentile  -1.15  0  3  0  8  0  -0.34  2  5  I  6 
IFPI > 90% percentile  -1.09  0  4  1  7  0  -0.49  1  4  1  7 
IFPI > 80% percentile  -1.03  1  4  0  7  1  -0.59  1  2  1  9 




















Key to Table 2. Panels A  to D each summarize results from  11 regressions, one for each base currency b (BEF, OEM, NLG, PI'E, ITL, IEP, GRO, DICK, ESP, GBP, 
FRF). In Panels A, B, and D the regressand , sb,t,t+A, is the three-month percentage spot-rate change for the private ECU while in Panel C the regressand is the change 
in the value of the Official ECU. The regressor is the corresponding beginning-of-period three-month forward premium, FPt"t,t+A' The data are weekly observations 
from October 1989 to February 1998, and in the regressions we follow Hansen and Hodrick (1980) to take into account the overlap in the holding periods. In each 
panel, the observations are dichotomized into two subsets: in Panels A and C on the basis of the percentage discount in the private ECU relative to the official one 
("P/O"), in Panel D on the basis of the absolute size of the forward premium (lFPI), and in Panel B on the basis of the sign of the forward premium. Each set has its 
own coefficient for the forward premium. In each of  the panels, j}bO should be closer to unity than Jibl, and upper lines should do better than lower ones. 
! Table 3. Tests of  Interactions Between the Competing Hypotheses on the Forward Bias 
Summary statistics on Sb,t,t+A = a.b + fibll [IF,b,t x Ip,b,t x FPb,t,t+A] + fib10 [IF,b,t x (l-lp,b,V x FPb,t,t+A] 
+ PbOI  [(I-IF,b,t) x Ib,t x FPb,t,t+A] + PbOO  [(I-IF,b,t) x (I-Ib,V x FPb,t,t+A] + llb,t,t+A 
Panel A: interaction of  PIO discounts and sign of  forward premium: regression coeficients 
deep P/O discounts (P/O < 40% percentile)  small P/O discounts (P/O;;" 40% percentile) 
positive FP  positive FP  negative FP 
mean  #>0  mean  mean  #>0  #<.0  #>0  #<0 
criterion for Ib t =  1  flbi  (si  flbO  fib!  (si  'f)  (si  'f)  (si  nif) 
FP>O  -1.76  4(1)  -2.04  -3.78  5(1)  4(0)  3(0) 
same  without DEM  -1.57  I  -2.04  -0.43  5 I  0  20 
_. 
Panel B: interaction of PIO discounts and size of  forward premium 
Panel B I: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficient between the PIO premium and the absolute size of the forward premium 
averageSRC  positive  negative 
Total sample  -0.04  5  6 
deep P/O discounts « 40 %ile)  -0.29  3  8 
small P/O discounts' (> 40 %ile  0.04  6  5 
Panel B2: COF regression coefficients 
deep P/O discounts (pIO < 40% percentile)  small P/O discounts (P/O :. 40% percentile) 
large FP  small FP  largeFP  small FP 
mean  #>0  #<.0  mean  #>0  #<0  mean  #>0  #<.0  mean  #>0  #<0 
criterion for Ib.t =  I  flb11  (signif)  (signif)  fib 11  (signif)  (signif)  flbIl  (silU1if)  (signif)  flbll  (signifl  (silU1if) 
· 
IFPI > 95% percentile  -0.72  4(0)  7(0)  -2.20  2(0)  9(4)  0.61  5(2)  6(0)  0.71  8(3)  3(0) 
· 
IFPI > 90% percentile  -0.91  2(0)  9(0)  -2.37  2(0)  9(2)  0.61  6(2)  5(0)  0.91  8(1)  3(0) 
· 
IFPI > 80% percentile  -1.05  2(0)  9(0)  -2.55  2(0)  9(2)  0.58  5(2)  6(0)  0.67  8(1)  3(0) 
· 
IFFI > 60% Dercentile  -1.83  1(0)  10(3)  -2.50  3(0)  8(3)  0.53  7(2)  4(0)  -0.44  5(0)  6(0) 
Key to Table 3. Each line in Panels A and B2 summarizes the results from II regressions, one for each base currency b (BEF, DEM, NLG, PTE, ITL, lEP, GRD, DKK, 
ESP, GBP, FRF). The regressand , sb,t,t+A, is the three-month percentage spot-rate change for the private ECU ,the regressor is the corresponding beginning-of-period 
three-month forward premium, FPb,t,t+A' The data are weekly observations from October 1989 to February 1998, and in the regressions we follow Hansen and 
Hodrick (1980) to take into account the overlap in the holding periods. In each panel, the observations are first grouped into two main subsamples on the basis of the 
percentage discount in the private ECU relative to the official one ("P/O"). Each main subsample is then further split up: in Panel A on the basis of the sign of the 
forward premium, and in Panel B2 on the basis of the absolute size of the forward premium. Each cell has its own coefficient for the forward premium.  Panel Bl, 
lastly, shows the average Spearman rank correlation coefficient between the P/O premium and the absolute size of the forward premium, in the total sample as well as 
in each of the main subsamples. Figure 1. Time-Series Plot of the P/O Discount 
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Key to Figure 1. The PIO premium is defined as the log of  the ratio of  the spot values of  the private and 
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Key to Figure 2. The interest-rate deviation is defined as the log of  the ratio of  the gross three-month 
risk-free rates of  return on private and official ECU. The gross three-month rate ofretum on official 
ECU is the harmonic weighted average of  the gross returns on the component currencies (see Appendix). 
The data are weekly, Oct 17, 1989 to Feb 15, 1998. 